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Introduction 
In the Epistle Dedicatory of Leviathan, Hobbes famously states that his aim is to 
‘speak not of the men but (in abstract) of the Seat of Power’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 3). In spite of 
this commitment, however, in Leviathan and in his other political writings Hobbes speaks not 
just of the ‘Seat’ and of the abstract rights and duties that come with it, but also of the men 
occupying that seat, and of the multiplicity of problems that these men may create. 
 In this essay, then, I focus on the under-explored distinction  between the political 
and the natural person that Hobbes attributes to sovereigns, be they monarchs or members of 
an assembly:  
[E]very man, or assembly that hath Sovereignty, representeth two 
persons, or (as the more common phrase is) has two capacities, one 
Naturall, and another Politique, (as a Monarch, hath the person not 
onely of the Common-wealth, but also of a man; and a Sovereign 
Assembly hath the Person not onely of the Commonwealth, but also 
of the Assembly). (Hobbes, 1991, p. 166) 
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This paper argues that there is a divergence between the theory and practice of 
sovereignty insofar as Hobbesian rulers qua natural men may undermine the end they ought 
to pursue qua political actors, namely the protection of the well-being of the people. In 
particular, as legislators, they may make laws that are unnecessary, or that the people cannot 
endure, or that give rise to their  impatience and discontent. I contend that in Hobbes’s theory 
the notion of good counsel provides a safety net against bad commands being issued by 
rulers. I claim that the process of consultation of good counsellors is an essential component 
of Hobbes’s understanding of law-making. Finally, I suggest that  the Hobbesian notions of 
counsel and counsellor  provide a valuable framework to illuminate aspects of contemporary 
global law-making.  
The paper is organized into sections:  the first three sections provide a detailed textual 
analysis of Hobbes’s argument on the legislator’s two persons and the role of counsellors; the 
last section fleshes out the interpretation of Hobbes’s legal theory  that the preceding analysis 
supports, and draws  some implications for contemporary debates. 
The Legislator as Persona Civitatis 
Hobbes argues that in the state of nature individuals disagree on ‘what is to be called right, 
what good, what virtue, what much, what little, what meum and tuum, what a pound, what a 
quart, &c’ (Hobbes, 1889, p. 188). No individual is strong enough to impose his or her own 
rules and standards on all others, and for this reason there is no natural end to controversies 
and quarrels. For the sake of self-preservation, each individual renounces their right to decide 
what is right and what is wrong, and transfers this right to the ‘sovereign’, who in the 
commonwealth is the only legislator (Hobbes, 1991, p. 184). The civil laws become to ‘all 
subjects the measures of their actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong, 
profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious’ (Hobbes, 1889, p. 188-9; see also Hobbes, 
1991, p. 183).  
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In Hobbes’s theory, the introduction of positive law protects individuals from the 
disorder of the state of nature. For Hobbes, ill-conceived or seemingly unfair laws are 
nevertheless superior to no positive laws at all, as the existence of law entails the existence of 
a commonwealth or union, and this in turn protects against the dangers of the war of all 
against all that one finds in the state of nature. Hobbes likens civil laws to hedges that guide 
the potentially errant traveller:  
For the use of lawes, (which are Rules Authorised) is not to bind the 
People from all Voluntary actions; but to direct and keep them in such a 
motion as not to hurt themselves by their own impetuous desires, 
rashnesse, or indiscretion; as Hedges are set, not to stop Travellers, but 
to keep them in the way. (Hobbes, 1991, pp. 239-40)  
 
Civil laws are ‘nothing other than commands of the holder of sovereign power in the 
commonwealth’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 79; see also Hobbes, 1889, p. 172; Hobbes, 1991, p. 183) 
and must be obeyed by citizens because they proceed from the will of the authorised 
legislator who ‘commands (…) as a Politick, not a Naturall person’ (Hobbes, 2010, 174). 1  
The sovereign is the origin of justice and therefore ‘no law can be unjust’ (Hobbes, 
1991, p. 239). Hobbes concedes that Christians must obey God, but points out that God 
stopped speaking directly to Man long ago; Hobbes devotes much attention to scriptural 
exegesis in order to demonstrate that God commands Man to obey the civil authorities. Thus, 
for Hobbes, it is seditious for citizens to challenge or resist the civil law even if their claims 
are born from religious thought. The law of nature which ‘forbids the violation of 
agreements’ by implication ‘commands that all civil laws be observed’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 
159). Hobbes emphasises that ‘the obligation to observe [the civil] laws is older than the 
promulgation of the laws themselves, because contained in the actual formation of the 
commonwealth’ (Hobbes, 1998, pp. 158-9; also, Hobbes, 1991, p. 183). For Hobbes, a freely-
undertaken political obligation precedes the making of specific laws, and this significantly 
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distances the Hobbesian understanding of law-as-command from that of Austin and legal 
positivists, who see the command itself as the origin of the obligation.2  
The commands of the Leviathan and the Word of God are alike insofar as they require 
obedience regardless of whether or not we agree with their content. The Leviathan’s 
commands, however, differ from those of God in one important respect. For Hobbes, God is 
unknowable (Hobbes, 2010, p. 167) and ‘has no ends’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 249). Therefore, we 
cannot understand, for example, why Adam and Eve were forbidden to eat from one tree in 
the Garden of Eden; Hobbes points out that ‘without the command, the fruit of the tree has 
nothing in its nature by which its eating could be morally bad’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 188). In 
contrast, the Leviathan is a man-made god and hence we may understand its aim and 
functions as we understand the purpose and operations of a watch. We know that ‘the end, for 
which [a Monarch or an Assembly] was trusted with the Sovereign power [is] the procuration 
of the safety of the people’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 231 emphasis in original), and that the 
sovereign is given absolute and unlimited power in order to attain this end. It follows that the 
ultimate purpose of all the civil laws introduced by the sovereign is to serve the salus populi.  
Indeed, Hobbes tells us that ‘a good Law is that, which is Needful, for the Good of the 
People’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 239, emphasis in original). Civil laws should pursue the well-being 
of the people in a very broad sense, and also make provisions for the protection of the most 
vulnerable:  
And whereas many men, by accident unevitable, become unable to 
maintain themselves by their labour; they ought not to be left to the 
charity of private persons; but be provided for, (as far-forth as the 
necessities of nature require,) by the Lawes of the Common-wealth. For 
as it is Uncharitablenesse in any man, to neglect the impotent; so it is in 
the Sovereign of a Common-wealth, to expose them to the hazard of such 
uncertain Charity (Hobbes, 1991, p. 239). 
 
According to Hobbes, rulers have every reason to issue good laws because to do so is in their 
own interest on this earth and in the interest of their salvation in the afterlife. To support the 
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second half of this conjunction, Hobbes tells us that the laws of nature that recommend the 
conditions of society and peace among men (Hobbes, 1998, p. 21) are ‘the eternal Law of 
God’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 192; p. 231), and that the sovereign is accountable to God (Hobbes, 
1991, p. 231) if he does not endeavour to follow the laws of nature. Hobbes does not detail 
precisely how the natural laws should inspire the Leviathan in domestic and international 
politics; he leaves it to his readers to speculate. Whereas  ‘[w]e cannot safely judge of men’s 
intentions’ (Hobbes, 2010, p. 200),  Hobbes suggests that we can safely  assume the intention 
of the legislator as political actor:   ‘the intention of the Legislator is always supposed to be 
Equity’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 194). Hobbes refers repeatedly to equity as ‘the principall Law of 
nature’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 195) and the ‘eternall Law of God’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 199); indeed, 
this law is particularly relevant to the sovereign in his role as sole legislator and arbitrator. In 
addition to equity, the laws of nature that recommend against cruelty, arrogance, 
revengefulness, greed and so forth should also presumably inspire the Leviathan’s rulings. In 
all of Hobbes’s works, the law of nature that recommends ‘gratitude’ occupies a high place 
on his list of natural laws; as argued by David Van Mill (2001, p 164), gratitude ought to 
inspire the sovereign’s attitude towards the people. Indeed, as the sovereign is not part of the 
social contract but is given his position of power as a ‘free gift’, and Hobbesian individuals 
are said to give free gifts only ‘upon hope to benefit from such action in the future’ (Hobbes, 
1998, p. 35), it follows that the sovereign ought ‘to try to ensure that the giver [of the gift] not 
have reason to be sorry he gave it’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 47; also, Hobbes, 1991, p 105). 
As mentioned above, it is not just for the sake of their eternal salvation that rulers 
should govern well, but also because it is in their earthly self-interest to do so. Throughout his 
works, Hobbes emphasises that ‘the good of the Sovereign and People, cannot be separated’ 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 240). He takes issue with Aristotle’s argument in the Politics that ‘there are 
two sorts of governments, whereof the one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to that 
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of the Subjects’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 116; also, Hobbes, 1889, p. 138). For Hobbes, this notion 
is misguided as it fails to grasp the coincidence of interest of the sovereign and the people. 3 
He insists that:  
The benefit …for which a body politic was instituted, namely, the peace 
and preservation of every particular man … extendeth equally both to the 
sovereign and to the subjects. For he or they that have the sovereign 
power, have but the defence of their persons, by the assistance of the 
particulars; and every particular man hath his defence by the union in the 
sovereign. As for other benefits which pertain not to their safety and 
sufficiency, but to their well and delightful being, such as are superfluous 
riches, they so belong to the sovereign, as they must also be in the 
subject, and so to the subject, as they must also be in the sovereign. For 
the riches and treasure of the sovereign, is the dominion he hath over the 
riches of his subjects. (Hobbes, 1889, pp. 137-8; also, Hobbes, 1998, p. 
116; Hobbes, 1991, p. 240)  
 
To conclude, the Great Leviathan is created with the purpose of protecting the people, and 
undivided, absolute power is the means he is given to perform this function. Although not 
subject to the civil laws (Hobbes, 1991, p. 184), the legislator must serve the  salus populi as 
suprema lex. As a watch that does not keep time is discarded, likewise a sovereign legislator 
that does not protect his people loses his raison d'être. Considerations of advantage on this 
earth, and of salvation in the after-life, ensure that the rational legislator will introduce laws 
that safeguard and advance the welfare of the commonwealth.  
The Legislator as Persona Naturalis 
Having argued that the sole aim of the sovereign’s absolute and undivided power is to 
promote the wellbeing of the people, Hobbes recognises that most individuals are nonetheless 
frightened by the idea of being subject to such a formidable entity. Hobbes explains that 
individuals’ ‘aversion’ for the notion of absolute sovereignty is ‘partly the fault of those who 
misuse their authority for their own greed when they are appointed to such a position of 
power’ (1998, p. 87). He acknowledges that people are afraid ‘that the holder of the sovereign 
power may not only set penalty he pleases for any offence he wishes, but may also, from 
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anger and greed, put innocent citizen to death who have done nothing against the laws’ 
(Hobbes, 1998, p. 120; also, Hobbes, 2005, p. 38). 
Although the ruler cannot act unjustly in their political capacity, Hobbes admits that 
rulers as natural men may fall short of what is expected of them in their political capacity; 
throughout his works we come across statements such as the following:  
The sovereign (considered in his natural person, and not in the person of 
the commonwealth) can make mistakes and can even sin. (Hobbes, 1889, 
p. 138) 
 
It is true that a sovereign monarch or the greater part of a sovereign 
assembly may ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their 
passions contrary to their consciences which is a breach of trust and of 
the law of nature. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 172-3) 
 
There are however many ways in which people, a council of optimates 
and a Monarch can sin against natural laws, by cruelty, for example, by 
unreasonableness, by insolence and by other vices, which do not come 
under the strict and accurate signification of wrong. (Hobbes, 1998, p. 
97) 
 
Hobbes emphasises that whenever rulers fail to deliver what they ought, ‘the fault is the 
Ruler’s, not the Regime’s. Not all the deeds of Nero are of the essence of Monarchy’ 
(Hobbes, 1998, p. 120). Occasionally Hobbes refers to rulers with good qualities: James I is 
praised for his wisdom, Charles I for his virtues of body or mind,  Henry VIII for his severity,  
Henry VII for filling his coffers, and so forth. More often, however, Hobbes conveys the idea 
that historical rulers are passionate men that rarely possess all the qualities that are needed. 
Indeed, in Behemoth one of the speakers comments that when the virtues of Henry VII and 
Henry VIII ‘shall be jointly in one King’ the commonwealth will be cured (Hobbes, 2010, p. 
181). 
In Hobbes’s texts we encounter two main explanations for bad government. First, as 
natural people, rulers are as subject to the disorder of the passions as other men. In his 
dedicatory letter of the Leviathan, Hobbes urges those who are ‘to govern a whole nation’ to 
look inside themselves: introspection will enable them to understand mankind (Hobbes, 1991, 
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p. 11). Across his works, Hobbes attributes to rulers the gamut of human emotions, from 
desire of power 4 to ‘greed’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 87), from ‘iealousie’ to fear (Hobbes, 2010, p. 
141), from anger and cruelty (Hobbes, 1998, p. 97) to ‘negligence’ and hazardousness 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 173) , from vain glory to ‘timorousness’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 220). This 
happens not just when the sovereign is an assembly, but also in Hobbes’s preferred form of 
government: ‘affections and passions … reign in everyone, as well monarch as subject; by 
which the monarch may be swayed to use [his] power amiss’ (Hobbes, 1889, p. 141). Hobbes 
adds that ‘the monarch besides the riches necessary for defence of the commonwealth may 
take so much from the subjects as may enrich his children, kindred and favourites to what 
degree he pleaseth’ (Hobbes, 1889, p. 142).  
The second explanation for defective ruling one can encounter in Hobbes’s texts, is  
rulers’  flawed reasoning and ignorance. For example, Hobbes points out the bad judgement 
of those  rulers who grant special treatment to those subjects of whom they are afraid: 
The benefits which a Sovereign bestoweth on a Subject, for fear of some power, and 
ability he hath to do hurt to the Common-wealth … are Sacrifices, which the sovereign 
(considered in his natural person, and not in the person of the commonwealth) makes 
for the appeasing the discontent of him he thinks more potent than himself; and 
encourage not to obedience, but on the contrary to the continuance, and increasing of 
further extortion. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 220 emphasis added; see also p. 241) 
Hobbes is consistently clear that if rulers reasoned well, and were not ignorant of the rights 
and duties of sovereignty, they would pursue the common interest because it is inseparable 
from their own. He offers many examples of rulers’ misguided judgement; for instance he 
mentions kings who ‘deny themselves some such necessary power not always (though 
sometimes) out of ignorance of what is necessary to the office they undertake; but many 
times out of a hope to recover the same again at their pleasure: wherein they reason not well’ 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 222, emphasis added). He also discusses kings who, in their natural 
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capacity, promise to act in a manner that is incompatible with their political role, thereby 
showing their ignorance of the rights and duties of sovereignty (Hobbes, 1998, p.100). In 
Hobbes’s account ‘ignorance of the Rights of sovereignty’ seems to affect  rulers of 
commonwealth by institution and rulers of commonwealth by acquisition alike (Hobbes, 
1991, p. 142)  
Bad judgement can lead rulers to appoint, or fail to punish, corrupt officials that are in charge 
of the administration of the commonwealth. And bad administration is a major source of 
discontent among the people, and has far-reaching consequences for the stability and peace of 
the state. 
Arguably, Hobbes draws a distinction between the shortcomings of monarchs on the 
one hand, and the inadequacies of assemblies on the other. In spite of being equally exposed 
to the disorder of the passions and to faulty judgement, monarchs are said to differ from 
members of assemblies insofar as it is easier for them to appreciate that their self-interest is 
inseparable from that of the commonwealth (Hobbes, 1991, p. 131). We may infer that 
Hobbesian monarchs are bad rulers when they fail to understand how to serve the common 
interest, which they know to coincide with their own. In contrast, assemblies rule poorly 
when their members are unable to realise what their self-interest truly is, and pursue instead 
an apparent good that damages the commonwealth and thus ultimately them themselves. The 
characteristic inability of members of a ruling assembly to see that their interest coincides 
with the interest of the commonwealth provides the foundations for Hobbes’s argument 
against democracy as form of government.  
On the consequences of bad ruling Hobbes expresses views that are prima facie 
contradictory. On the one hand,  Hobbes plays down the problems created by sovereigns qua 
natural men, calling them ‘inconveniences’. He reminds citizens that life is never without 
inconveniences, that nothing is absolutely good or evil, that human nature is what it is, that 
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bad government is better than no government, that monarchies are preferable to aristocracies 
and democracies because ‘[i]n a monarchy …anyone who is prepared to live quietly is free 
from danger, whatever the character of the ruler’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 120). He reassures 
citizens that ‘no example readily comes to mind of a subject robbed of life and property by 
his prince from sheer caprice without any fault on his part’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 126).  
On the other hand, Hobbes puts across a different message, namely that bad 
government causes discontent, that discontent is the ultimate source of rebellion, and that no 
ruler can ignore ‘the danger that may arrive to himselfe in his natural Person, from rebellion’ 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 233). In the Dialogue we learn that dissatisfaction with the King’s 
behaviour, and in particular his favouritism, was a major factor contributing to civil war: 
‘[t]he greatest Complaint by them made against the unthriftiness of their Kings was for the 
inriching now and then a favourite’ (Hobbes, 2005, p. 15; see also Hobbes, 1998, p. 119 and 
Hobbes, 1889, p. 142).  
Hobbes’s apparent contradiction, however, dissolves if we assume that his theory 
contains two strands of argument, one aimed at rulers, and one at the ruled 5:  to the ruled 
Hobbes recommends endurance, and to the rulers he commends self-restraint.   
To summarise, in Hobbes’s argument we notice a discrepancy between the theory and 
practice of sovereignty; while in principle rulers have every reason to protect the ruled, in 
reality, blinded by their passions, misguided by ignorance, and misled by poor judgement, 
rulers may damage the commonwealth. While in principle (as shown in the former section) 
the positive  law is neither contrary to the laws of nature, nor detrimental to the well-being of 
the commonwealth, in practice it may turn out to be all those things. The distinction made by 
Aristotle between bad rulers pursuing their private interest on the one hand, and good rulers 
pursuing the public interest on the other hand, becomes to Hobbes a distinction between 
enlightened rulers capable of pursuing their ‘true self-interest’, which coincides with the 
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interest of the people, versus misguided rulers who fail to understand how to pursue their self-
interest, or what their self-interest truly is.  
In addition, in  Hobbes’s texts we have found two explanations for bad ruling: one is  
passions-based, and the other is reason-based. 6  Although there is ample scope for debate, it 
may be argued that in Hobbes’s theory the rulers’ passions do not provide a sufficient 
condition for  misrule:  greed alone, or glory alone -  without a mistaken opinion  about  the 
long-term consequences of greed- or glory-seeking behaviour - cannot induce  Hobbesian 
kings  to abuse their  power.  By contrast, according to our analysis,   poor judgement is not 
only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for  bad government:  out of ignorance 
moderate rulers may  do things that damage the commonwealth.  
This interpretation of bad ruling  provides Hobbes with the belief that misrule can in 
principle be cured. Indeed if misgovernment was the inevitable outcome of rulers’  passions, 
there would be no solution to the problem because the passions cannot be removed from the 
heart of  Hobbesian men. However, in so far as   poor judgement   plays  a pivotal role in bad 
government, and  judgement can be educated and assisted,  Hobbes  is able to  offer a 
solution to bad ruling by providing rulers with the aid of good counsellors. The  burden of the 
next section is to  support  this latter claim. 
The Legislator and their Counsellors 
Following Hobbes we compared the Leviathan to a watch and noted  that the purpose and 
function of both can be fully understood as they are both designed by man. There is, 
however, a crucial difference between the Leviathan and a watch: whereas the latter is 
predictable, its mechanism regular, its movement exact, the former can be erratic and 
inconstant; this is because the sovereign is embodied in a natural person, and the passions and 
actions of a natural person cannot be predicted nor controlled. In the abstract, a rational 
legislator will only issue commands that are conducive to the well-being of the 
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commonwealth, however in practice law-makers fail to achieve this ideal. Hobbes alerts his 
readers to this divergence between theory and practice:  
In the Distribution of land, the Common-wealth it selfe, may be 
conceived to have a portion, and possesse, improve the same by their 
Representatative; and that such portion may be made sufficient, to 
susteine the whole expence to the common Peace, and defence 
necessarily required: Which were very true, if there could be any 
representative conceived free from human passions and infirmities. But 
the nature of men being as it is, the setting forth of Publique Land, or of 
any certaine revenue for the Common-wealth, is in vaine. (Hobbes, 1991, 
pp. 172-3, emphasis added)  
 
But then, if actual rulers inevitably fall short of being enlightened legislators, how can the 
well-being of the commonwealth be protected? The aim of this section is to argue that 
Hobbes answers this question using the under-studied notion of  ‘counsel’. 7 
We may begin by recalling that in the Dialogue the Lawyer states that to lay down the 
laws of the Saxons, ‘the Kings called together the Bishops, and a great part of the wisest and 
discreetest men of the Realm, and made Laws by their advice’, on which procedure the 
Philosopher comments: 
[T]here is no King in the World, being of ripe years and sound mind, that 
made any Laws otherwise; for it concerns them in their interest to make 
such Laws as the people can endure, and may keep them without 
impatience, and live in strength and courage to defend their King and 
Countrey, against his potent neighbours. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 144) 
 
Assuming that the Philosopher voices Hobbes’s opinion, we are told that the king ‘of sound 
mind’ seeks counsel in order to issue laws that can be endured by the people and secure their 
contentment and fidelity. Hobbes is clear that ‘absolute Kings have their counsellors, by 
whom they wish to be advised and to have their commands in all important matters reviewed, 
though not revoked’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 83).  
Hobbes’s account of the civil war in Behemoth, where references to good and evil 
counsel and counsellors are constant and telling, suggests the topical relevance of 
‘counselling’ in seventeenth century England: we are told that the Scots were claiming that 
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the King was ‘in the hands of euill Counsellors’ (Hobbes, 2010, p. 148), that little by little the 
Parliamentarians removed ‘from about [the King] those they thought could best councell 
him’,  that one of the Parliament’s plots was ‘to make the King giue vp his friends and 
Councellors to them to be put to death, banishment, or imprisonment, for their good will to 
him’ (Hobbes, 2010, p. 212), and so forth.  
  In this paper, we shall focus mainly on Chapter XXV of Leviathan (‘Of Counsell’) – 
the chapter that, perhaps revealingly, immediately precedes ‘Of  Civill Lawes’ – to examine 
the part played by counsellors in preventing or mitigating problems that may come to the 
commonwealth as a consequence of the passions,  ignorance, or poor judgement of rulers. For 
this purpose it is worth reminding ourselves of the role, disposition of mind, intellectual 
abilities, expertise, and status that Hobbes ascribes to good counsellors to the sovereign, and 
then we will inspect the process of consultation that, according to Hobbes, facilitates good 
counsel.  
The role of counsellors is, unsurprisingly, to provide ‘counsel’. Hobbes defines 
counsel as advice that is given in the interest of the counselled and not of the counsellor: 
Therefore between Counsel and Command, one great difference is, that 
Command is directed to a man's own benefit; and Counsel to the benefit 
of another man. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 176) 
 
Such a definition sheds light on the disposition of mind required in a counsellor: he 
must be capable of considering the good of someone else and possess the good will to advise 
him on how to attain it:  
A counsellor … (by the definition of Counsell) ought to regard, not his own benefit, 
but his whom he adviseth. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 178) 
 
As such an attitude of mind is at odd with his description of human psychology, Hobbes 
remarks that ‘they that give Counsell to the Representative person of a Common-wealth, may 
have, and have often their particular ends, and passions, that render their Counsells always 
suspected, and many times unfaithful’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179), and sets down ‘for the first 
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condition of a good Counsellour, That his Ends and Interest, be not inconsistent with the 
Ends and Interest of him he Counselleth’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179, emphasis in original). 
Hobbes stresses that ‘he that giveth counsel to his Soveraign, (whether a Monarch, or an 
Assembly) when he asketh it, cannot in equity be punished for it’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 177, 
emphasis added), thereby suggesting that a good counsellor acts in good faith.  
With regard to counsellors’ disposition of mind, Hobbes distinguishes between 
‘corrupt Counsellours’ who are ‘bribed by their own interest’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 178) and 
resort to exhortations and dehortations when they deliver counsel, and good counsellors who 
are able to consider and advise in the interest of the counselled and to offer advice ‘as briefly 
as the evidence will permit’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179-80) using ‘firm ratiocination’ and using 
‘significant and proper language (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179)  8. 
In addition to the above attitude of mind, a good counsellor needs specific intellectual 
abilities. While in On the Citizen Hobbes likens counsellors to the ‘head’ of the 
commonwealth 9, in Leviathan, Hobbes attributes to counsellors specific faculties of mind, 
namely ‘memory’ and ‘mentall discourse’:  
Counsellors, by whom all things needful for [the Artificial Man] to 
know, are suggested unto it, are the memory. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 9) 
 
And to the Person of the Commonwealth, his Counsellors serve him in 
the place of Memory and Mentall Discourse. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179) 
 
The counsellors’ memory of relevant political experiences, combined with rationality, 
provides solid ground for prudent and wise counsel:  
he who hath by Experience, or Reason, the greatest and surest prospect of 
consequences Deliberates best himselfe; and is able when he will, to give 
the best counsell unto others. (Hobbes, 1991, p.46) 
 
Experience, memory, and reason enable counsellors to have good judgement, and judgement 
is the ‘wit required for Counsel’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 180). Thus Hobbes sees sound counsel as 
a corollary of rational intellectual ability; Hobbes distinguishes ‘apt’ and ‘fit’ counsellors 
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from ‘inept’ and ‘unfit’ counsellors and points out that ‘the Vertues, and Defects of Counsell, 
are the same with the Vertues, and Defect Intellectuall’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 179). 
 In addition to intellect, Hobbes believes that a wide range of practical knowledge and 
expertise is required to advise a commonwealth (Hobbes, 1991, p 180). Hobbes points out 
that very few people have the relevant expertise and that members of assemblies usually lack 
it.  
Lastly, Hobbes highlights the status of a counsellor and explains that ‘Counsellors 
without other employment then to advise are not public ministers’; he expands: 
Neither a counsellor nor a councell of state if we consider it with no 
authority of Judicature or command but only of giving advice to the 
sovereign when it is required, or of offering it when it is not required is a 
Public person. For the Advice is addressed to the Sovereign only, whose 
person cannot in his own presence be represented to him by another. 
(Hobbes, 1991, p. 170) 
 
In Hobbes’s argument, all the above characteristics (disposition of mind, intellectual abilities, 
expertise, and status) do not guarantee good counsel. Hobbes emphasises the importance of 
the process by which consultation is sought or offered. He is adamant that public consultation 
and debate ignites the natural ambition that is latent in many people, and spurs them to have 
their own counsel adopted, and to use rhetoric rather than logic to win the argument. Hence, 
Hobbes arrives at the view that public consultation in assemblies rarely produces good 
counsel.  
Indeed, Hobbes suggests that public consultations are not merely structurally prone to  
poor judgements, but are intrinsically deleterious to the security of the commonwealth. For 
Hobbes, public debate allows the rulers’ enemies (both domestic and foreign) to be privy to 
the same information as the rulers’ friends. Therefore, Hobbes suggests that while private 
consultation with selected counsellors improves a ruler’s deliberative process and is 
beneficial to the commonwealth, public consultations can be worse for the commonwealth 
than the rulers’ unchallenged reliance on his own judgement: 
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A man that doth his businesse by the help of many and prudent 
Counsellours, with everyone consulting apart, does it best, as he that 
useth able Seconds at Tennis play, placed in their proper stations. He 
does next best, that useth his own Judgement only; as he that has no 
Second at all. But he that is carried up and down to his businesse in a 
framed which cannot move but by the plurality of consenting opinions 
…does it worst of all. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 183)  
 
Finally, we may recall from the previous section that Hobbes gives examples of decisions by 
rulers that show their ignorance of the rights and duties of sovereignty.  Hobbes regarded 
such rights and duties as part of the ‘infallible rules’ of politics that he had himself 
demonstrated in On the Citizen 10; in the chapter on Counsel in Leviathan, on such abstract 
matters, the understanding of which require the use of the correct method  and devoted 
periods of study,  Hobbes appears to be offering to the sovereign his own counsel. He writes: 
when for the doing of anything, there be Infallible rules (as in Engines, and edifices, the 
rules of Geometry) all the experience of the world cannot equall his Counsell, that has 
learned, or found out the Rule. (Hobbes, 1991, p. 180) 
 
To conclude, we had established in the foregoing sections that Hobbes saw a problem in the 
embodiment of the sovereign in a natural man: because of their  emotions, their fallible 
thought processes, their ignorance, the sovereign may not act as they ought in their political 
capacity. According to our reading of texts, Hobbes sees careful consultation with appropriate 
counsellors as a practical solution to this problem.  
Command, Counsel, and  Law-Making: an Overview 
Based on the textual analysis of the foregoing sections,  we can now advance an 
interpretation of Hobbesian law-as-command, and of the role of counsel in law-making.  As a 
preliminary, it may be helpful to summarise the main findings thus far.  
First, we argued that disagreements on values (on right and wrong, just and unjust, 
and so on) turn the state of nature into a state of war, and motivate Hobbesian men to 
authorise a sovereign legislator (which may be a monarch or an assembly) to arbitrate upon 
the ‘rules’ and ‘measures’ of their actions. Thus a ‘decision’ is at the foundation of Hobbes’s 
understanding of civil law. In abstracto, the arbitrariness of the sovereign’s decision is 
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limited by some important constraints described by Hobbes: the sovereign legislator ought to 
issue only commands that serve the purpose for which the commonwealth was created, 
namely the salus populi, and ought to capture the spirit of the laws of nature in the 
legislation. In abstracto, furthermore, the sovereign’s self-interest will drive him to perform 
his duty, as his own wellbeing (security and wealth on this earth, and salvation in the 
afterlife) depends on the wellbeing of the people.  
Second, we showed that in practice, rulers may be swayed by passions, misled by 
ignorance, or misguided by poor judgement and therefore they may fail comprehend how to 
attain the  salus populi, or they may mistake an apparent good  for their true self-interest. Due 
to this theory-practice gap, wrong-headed rulings and deficient legislation can be made in 
practice. We noted that Hobbes refers to the problems caused by real rulers as 
‘inconveniences’ and we distinguished two separate strands within his argument: one, 
directed at citizens, reminds them that the very existence of law, regardless of its content, 
provides a state of peace, and peace entails as a minimum ‘lack of war’. Another argument, 
presumably directed at rulers themselves, suggests that only good laws ensure the people’s 
obedience and create the conditions for lasting peace.  
Third, we claimed that in order to minimise the distance between the theory and the 
practice of sovereignty, Hobbes uses the notion of ‘counsel’. With their sound judgement, 
memory, experience, and expertise, ‘good counsellors’ can assist the sovereign in the 
deliberations that precede the issuing of commands. We suggested that the concept of 
‘counsel’ is for Hobbes an integral part of the practical process of law-making, and that it is 
no coincidence that the chapter on Counsel in Leviathan immediately precedes the Chapter 
on Civil Laws.  
According to our reading of texts  (i) the very existence of positive law is a protection 
against the disorder of the state of nature; (ii) the law is not the source of political obligation 
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but its consequence; (iii) regardless of  content,  any law issued by the authorised law-giver is 
binding; (iv) a law is ‘good’ if it is ‘necessary’ for the  salus populi; (v) a law  is ‘good’ if it 
captures  the spirit of the laws of nature which recommend the conditions of peace and advise 
against inequity, revengefulness, cruelty, pride, partiality, greed, and so forth; (vi) in practice 
a law is more likely to be good  if it is issued after careful consultation with experienced and 
wise counsellors.  
To put the same thing in different words, in  Hobbes’s argument  we have found  the 
function of law (i);  the formal requirements of a valid law  [(ii), (iii)];  some guidance to 
evaluate whether the substance of  law is ‘good’  [(iv), (v)], and an  indication of the 
procedure that can facilitate the issuing of good laws (vi) 11.  
On the one hand, some arbitrariness is built into Hobbes’s concept of law (Letwin 
2005); the ambiguity of conditions (iv), (v), and (vi) is evident when we remind ourselves 
that, although some behaviours such as cruelty and vengefulness are (and will always be) 
condemned by the  laws of nature, for Hobbes there is no objective way of establishing which 
acts count as cruel: ‘one man calls cruelty what another calls justice’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 31). 
Indeed, Hobbes maintains that one cannot conclusively establish the ‘obscure’ laws of nature 
at all: 
The unwritten law of nature, though it be easy to such as without partiality and 
passion make use of their natural reason, and therefore leaves the violators thereof 
without excuse; yet considering there be very few, perhaps none, that in some cases 
are not blinded by self-love, or some other passion, it is now become of all laws the 
most obscure, and has consequently the greatest need of able interpreters. (Hobbes, 
1991, p. 190-1) 
 
In his writings, Hobbes often highlights the role of the sovereign decision in interpreting the 
laws of nature: 
Theft, murder, Adultery, and all injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature; but what is 
to be called Theft, what murder, what Adultery, what injury in a Citizen, this is not to 
be determined by the naturall, but by the civill Law: for not every taking away of the 
thing which another possesseth, but onely another mans goods is theft; but what is 
ours, and what anothers, is a question belonging to the civill Law. In like manner, not 
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every killing of a man is murder, but onely that which the civill Law forbids; neither 
is all encounter with women Adultery, but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. 
(Hobbes, 1998, p. 16) 
 
On the other hand, in spite of his nominalism, Hobbes suggests that the meaning of the  salus 
populi is largely uncontroversial, and that a rational legislator with his counsellors can 
establish how to secure it in practice.  
Where does this leave us? In the history of the concept of law, Hobbes’s legal theory 
is generally seen as a move away from ancient and medieval theories of law: Hobbes’s laws 
are not linked to any sort of cosmic order, nor anchored to eternal truths, and thus mark the 
beginning of a genuinely new phase in legal thinking  12.  In this paper we have seen that  the 
salus populi  is the anchor of Hobbesian jurisprudence and sets limits to arbitrariness:   ‘a 
good Law is that, which is Needful, for the Good of the People’ (Hobbes, 1991, p. 239, 
emphasis in original). By focusing on the Hobbesian distinction between the natural and 
political persons embodied in rulers, and by examining the role of counsel and command in 
law-making, this paper has shown that -  in addition to a definition  of  ‘valid’ and  formally 
‘good’ law - Hobbes’s legal theory  contains a discussion of both  the substance  of good laws 
and the practice of law-making.  According to our reading,  counselling  is an important 
component of Hobbes’s  discourse on law and sheds  light on his conviction  that for the sake 
of the peace  of real commonwealths the practice of law-making is all-important. 
Counsellors, Hobbes stresses, are both the ‘memory’ and ‘mental discourse’ of the Great 
Leviathan: Hobbesian law-making is  an  activity that  takes into account relevant past 
experience as well as the changing needs of the commonwealth.  
 Admittedly, on counselling, Hobbes makes a number of claims that do not resonate 
with the contemporary reader.  First, we have argued  that throughout his writings Hobbes 
voices his disapproval of consultative bodies or  assemblies, and recommends  the exclusive 
use of private counsellors 13; indeed, because of his understanding of  human psychology, 
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Hobbes  believed that public debate prevents the delivery of good counsel.  Second, Hobbes 
stresses that no counsellor can claim  a ‘right’   to provide counsel, nor to have their counsel 
followed by  the legislator because  such rights  would effectively divide the sovereign 
power.  
This notwithstanding, some of Hobbes’s reflections on command and counsel may 
offer a valuable framework to  illuminate   different aspects of global law-making today 14. 
 On one level, we can use Hobbes’s concepts of command and counsel  to shed light  
on  the  relationship between states-as-legislators on the one hand  and NGO’s-as-counsellors  
on the other , and  to distinguish between different   types of NGOs counselling. Although 
Hobbesian states would not accept internal or external challenges to their sovereignty, 
arguably they would be willing to follow practical impartial advice aimed at increasing 
domestic and international stability and peace. While Hobbesian Leviathans would resist or 
ignore self-appointed counsellors that publicly critique their policies or dispute their 
sovereign rights, they should be willing to engage with counsellors who take a neutral and 
objective standpoint and propose practical ways to address existing problems and concerns. 
The  question arises of to what extent NGOs can meet all the criteria of the Hobbesian 
counsellor, and in particular the criterion  that good   counselling is always in the interest of 
the counselled. From the Hobbesian perspective on counselling, one needs  to re-visit the 
notion of the interests that states are supposed to represent and  to reflect on the relationship 
between the interest of  governments and  people. 
On  another level,  the role of counsel in modern day international law might be seen 
in the way that organizations such as the  International Committee of the Red Cross play a 
crucial part in providing information and advice on international law-making, demonstrating 
how Hobbes’s insights into counselling can offer a normative justification for practices that 
challenge the sovereign role of states in the international legal realm. Interestingly, the  
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ICRC’s  mission statement contains  a number of pledges that can be interpreted through the 
Hobbesian lens of counselling: a  promise  of  neutrality and impartiality, a  commitment to  
discretion and to refrain from publicity, and above all the undertaking of counselling in the 
interest of  humanity. 15.  
To conclude,  although Hobbes puts forward an  argument on  counselling that is in many 
ways  contextual and therefore interesting  only from a historical point of view,  he also offers 
a  perspective  that enables us to rethink  critically the different  meaning, role and 
significance of NGOs and INGO’s in  global law-making today. 
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Notes 
1- It is outside the scope of this paper to discuss civic disobedience. The topic is 
controversial;  for my own understanding,  see  Slomp (2009)  
2- On this see Claire Finkelstein (2005, p XIII )  
3- For Hobbes the distinction between tyrant and king does not describe different forms 
or conditions of government but different feelings towards rulers and regimes (1998, 
p 93): a beloved ruler is called king, while one who is hatred is called a tyrant (1998, 
116).  
4- ‘I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restlesse desire of 
Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. (…) And from hence it is, that Kings, 
whose power is greatest, turn their endeavours to the assuring it at home by Lawes, or 
abroad by Wars’ (Hobbes 1991, 70). 
5-  As I argued elsewhere, I take the view that a number of contradictory remarks in 
Hobbes’s texts (for example the claim that favouring friends  is harmless and part of 
the King’s prerogative, or dangerous and potentially part of his downfall) can be 
explained if we assume that in his writing he was addressing different audiences, the 
citizens and the King (Slomp 2015). 
6- I owe this way of putting the point to Glen Newey. See also Newey 2008 
7-  Among the relatively few interpreters who have shown an interest in Hobbes’s 
concepts of counsel and counsellor it is worth mentioning  Susan Moller Okin 1982 
and Adrian Blau 2009.  At the time of writing the paper I was unaware of some recent 
very important   work on counsel and command by Joanne Paul (2015). 
8-  For a  stimulating discussion of corrupt counsellors, see Adrian Blau 2009 
9-  ‘Almost everyone who makes the comparison of commonwealth and citizens with the 
body and its members says that the holder of sovereign power in the commonwealth is 
to the whole commonwealth what the head is to the whole man. But it appears from 
what has been said that the recipient of such power (whether man or council) has the 
relation to the commonwealth not of the head but of the soul (…) The appropriate 
analogy for the head is rather the corps of counsellors or (if he consults only one man) 
the single counsellor whose advice the holder of the sovereign power makes use of in 
the most important matters of government.’ (Hobbes, 1998, p. 88-9) 
10-  ‘The Rules of Just and Vniust sufficiently demonstrated, and from Principles euident 
to the meanest capacity, haue not been wanting; and notwithstanding the obscurity of 
their Author, haue shined not onely in this, but also in forraigne Countries to men of 
good education’ (Hobbes, 2010, pp158-9 italics in the original). 
11-  I owe this way of putting the point to Maximilain Jaede.  There are of course  other 
aspects of Hobbes’s  law that this paper has not examined, such as  the ‘material 
circumstances’ of a valid law, and the issue of punishment. Regarding punishment, 
we have seen that the protection/obedience principle is the foundation of the 
Hobbesian system of law; the sovereign’s duty to protect entails the duty to punish  
those who disobey  the law. Regarding the ‘material circumstances ‘ of a valid law, 
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Hobbes singles out  promulgation or ‘Declaration of the Law’,  ‘sufficient signs of the 
Author’ of the law (Hobbes 1991, 189) and   intention or ‘intendment’ of the law: 
“The Legislator known, and the laws, either by writing, or by the light of nature, 
sufficiently published; there wanteth yet another very material circumstance to make 
them obligatory. For it is not the Letter, but the Intentment, or Meaning; that is the 
autentique interpretation of the Law” ( Hobbes, 1991, 190). For a recent stimulating 
discussion of what Hobbes calls the ‘material circumstances’ of a valid law, see May 
(2013).  
12- Some interpreters see in Hobbes’s legal theory an anticipation of Austin and legal 
positivism (‘ The traditional view of Hobbes on law holds that he is a legal positivist’ 
(Finkelstein, 2005,   p xiii)) while others see it as a precursor of Lon Fuller (‘In my 
view, Hobbes’s discussion of the natural law limits on positive law is similar to Lon 
Fuller’s view in the Morality of Law’ (May, 2013, p 121) 
13- Contra Susan Moller Okin (1982) 
14- I owe to Tony Lang the good points of this brief discussion of counselling in the 
contemporary world.  All errors are my own. 
15- In addition, on its official website, the ICRC  gives details of its  experience and  
expertise and of its long-standing history of  good will and  trustworthiness. As we 
have seen above, these are also characteristics that Hobbes attributes to good 
counsellors. 
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